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MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL AND
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: THE CASE
FOR A CONSISTENT APPROACH
JOHN F. COONEY*
One of the most important policy issues facing the federal
environmental criminal enforcement program is how the Department of
Justice ("Department") should coordinate the prosecution of corporations
for violations of law that occur in several judicial districts and thus fall
within the jurisdiction of multiple United States Attorneys. The pattern of
prosecutions in the multi-district cases of the last decade demonstrates that
in some cases, the standing Department policy governing successive
prosecutions has not been followed, resulting in a substantial waste of
scarce prosecutorial resources and unfairness to corporate defendants.
In important corporate criminal cases outside the environmental area,
such as the highly visible prosecutions against Enron and WorldCom
coordinated by the Department's Corporate Fraud Task Force,1 all crimes
against the company have been charged in a single corporate prosecution.
This Article examines whether there are features of environmental criminal
cases that might warrant multiple prosecutions against a corporation on
similar charges in different judicial districts and would justify a departure
from the normal Department policy on successive prosecutions.
* Partner, Venable LLP. The author's firm participated in the Royal Caribbean and
McWane cases discussed in this Article. Venable's Judson Starr and Joseph Block, two
former Chiefs of the Environmental Crimes Section, reviewed and commented on this
Article.
I The Corporate Fraud Task Force was created by Executive Order No. 13271, 67 Fed.
Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002). It consists of the Deputy Attorney General, two Assistant
Attorneys General, the Director of the FBI, and seven U.S. Attorneys. The Task Force
provides direction for the investigation and prosecution of significant cases of corporate
fraud and related financial crime.
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I. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTIONS
Two factors define environmental criminal prosecutions: the absence
of a specific intent element for the crimes and the division of prosecutorial
authority between Washington and the offices of the ninety-four U.S.
Attorneys.
A. ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT
Most environmental criminal statutes do not require the government to
prove that the defendant wrongfully intended to discharge a pollutant, but
simply require evidence that the individual or entity knew that it was taking
action likely to lead to release of a pollutant. For example, the criminal
enforcement provision of the Clean Water Act2 provides that any person
who "knowingly violates" specific provisions of the statute or "any permit
condition or limitation" may be guilty of a felony,3 and that any person who
"negligently violates" those sections or a permit provision may be guilty of
a misdemeanor.4
The courts have consistently held that the knowledge requirement
imposed by § 1319(c)(2) requires only a general awareness that the
defendant was dealing with a pollutant and awareness that a discharge was
occurring or was likely to occur. The critical case was United States v.
Weitzenhoff5 There, five judges of the Ninth Circuit dissented from the
denial of rehearing en banc in a case involving conviction for a felony
violation of the Clean Water Act.6 The dissenters objected that the phrase
"knowingly violates" in § 1319(c) required proof of actual knowledge 7 and
that the panel had improperly treated the statute as creating a "public
welfare" offense for which no evidence of intent was required to support a
conviction. 8  The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 9  Since then, lower
courts have routinely upheld convictions based on a minimal showing of
awareness and without requiring proof of illegal intent.'
0
2 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000).
3 Id. § 1319(c)(2).
4 Id. § 1319(c)(1).
35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Mariani v. United States, 513 U.S.
1128 (1995).
6 Id. at 1293.
7 Id. at 1293-94 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 1296 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
9 Mariani, 513 U.S. 1128.
10 In Hanousek v. United States, Justices O'Connor and Thomas dissented from the
denial of certiorari in a case that challenged the constitutionality of a conviction under §
1319(c) based on the public welfare offense doctrine. 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
[Vol. 96
2006] PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 437
The knowledge requirement is particularly attenuated for corporations.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a company may be held
criminally liable for the actions of its employees if the acts were taken on
its behalf and were within the scope of the employees' authority." Under
the doctrine of collective knowledge, the knowledge of all employees may
be aggregated and imputed to the corporation. 12 Thus, a corporation may be
convicted of a felony offense even if no one person had awareness of the
facts necessary to satisfy the knowledge requirement.
A criminal charge against a corporation is relatively easy to prove.
Stripped to its essentials, the government only needs to demonstrate that a
substance that falls within the statutory definition of a "pollutant" was
released into the environment;13 that the release can be traced to a corporate
facility; 14 and that a sentient corporate employee at the facility took a step
that proximately resulted in a release.' 5  Other factors related to the
discharge-such as the subjective intent of employees, the existence of
corporate policies designed to prevent discharges, or the adoption of
enhanced environmental equipment and controls-do not affect the
essential elements of the offense or constitute affirmative defenses. They
are relevant only to the prosecutor's decision whether to indict and, if so,
what offenses and how many counts should be charged.
For these reasons, corporations rarely take environmental criminal
charges to trial. When the government concludes that a criminal disposition
is appropriate, the company usually concludes that its self-interest would be
served by a negotiated plea agreement, through which it may seek to
minimize the number of charges and the financial consequences.
B. ALLOCATION OF PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
Responsibility for prosecuting environmental crimes is divided
between the U.S. Attorneys in various judicial districts and the
Environmental Crimes Section ("ECS"), a group of approximately thirty
lawyers located in the Environment and Natural Resources Division in
Washington, D.C. who are dedicated exclusively to the prosecution of
dissenting). The Justices were not able to attract additional support for their position, and
the Supreme Court has never considered this issue.
11 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
13 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
14 See United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1993).
15 See Technic, 314 F.3d at 1042.
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environmental offenses and related crimes.' 6 ECS personnel are involved in
larger and more complex environmental criminal investigations and in cases
that involve national criminal enforcement policy priorities. 17
U.S. Attorneys handle the majority of environmental prosecutions by
volume, while the ECS takes the lead in prosecution of between 25% and
30% of cases. The ECS cases, however, account for approximately two-
thirds of the total fines and restitution obtained in federal environmental
criminal cases. The ECS is also involved in most large corporate
investigations and prosecutions. 8
The current allocation of prosecutorial responsibilities is, in part, the
result of a policy dispute in the early 1990s. In a series of highly visible
environmental cases, U.S. Attorneys and the ECS contested their respective
roles in investigations and the ultimate decision whether to initiate a
criminal prosecution. A group of U.S. Attorneys and state officials who
were unhappy with ECS's decisions took their concerns to Congress.
During the 1992 presidential election campaign, the Oversight
Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee held a well-
publicized hearing to explore whether senior political officials of the
Department were stifling efforts by line prosecutors and the EPA to bring
environmental criminal charges against corporations. 19 One of the principal
issues of concern to the Subcommittee was what it perceived to be an effort
by Main Justice to centralize control over environmental cases and to curtail
the authority of the U.S. Attorneys to initiate environmental prosecutions
without explicit approval from Washington.20
In August 1994, Attorney General Reno resolved the dispute by
issuing an amendment to the United States Attorneys' Manual ("USAM")
that divided prosecutions into "national interest cases" and lower priority
16 Interview by Corporate Crime Reporter with David M. Uhlmann, Chief, Envtl. Crimes
Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 23, 2004), reprinted in 6 A.B.A. SEC. ENV'T ENERGY &
RESOURCES 12, 13 (2005), available at www.abanet.org/environ/committees/environcrimes/
newsletter/may05/envenforcementMay05.pdf [hereinafter Uhlmann Interview].
17 Id
18 David M. Uhlmann, Chief, Envtl. Crimes Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech to the
District of Columbia Bar Association (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Uhlmann Speech]; see
Uhlmann Interview, supra note 16.
19 See EPA 's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.
(1992).
20 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H. COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 102D CONG., DAMAGING DISARRAY: ORGANIZATIONAL
BREAKDOWN AND REFORM IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1994).
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cases. 21 The revised policy established the current structure, under which
responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes
would rest with the U.S. Attorneys, "except in cases of national interest.,
22
In cases of national interest, the U.S. Attorney's Office and the ECS
"participate jointly as co-counsel from the initiation of the investigation
through prosecution, unless otherwise agreed., 23 The term "case of national
interest" was defined to include "a case with simultaneous investigations in
multiple districts.",
24
As joint co-counsel in cases of national interest, the exact roles of ECS
personnel and U.S. Attorneys are subject to negotiation, and the outcome
varies from case to case.25 The allocation of responsibilities in a specific
matter may depend upon such factors as the relative technical expertise of
the prosecutors involved, their respective workloads, the political
significance of a matter within the local jurisdictions, and its importance in
terms of overall national priorities. In some matters, ECS personnel may
conduct the investigation, present nearly all the evidence to the grand jury,
and take the lead at trial. In other cases, the U.S. Attorney may run the
case, or the two offices may divide the responsibilities.
The joint authority over major environmental crimes prosecutions
engages the basic centrifugal mechanism that affects the Department in
other enforcement fields. Once a criminal investigation is initiated in his
district, the U.S. Attorney typically will seek to initiate a prosecution if a
criminal charge can be brought in good faith and with a reasonable certainty
of success at trial. The desire to prosecute may be based upon a number of
factors, including the prosecutor's belief that under his oath of office, he is
obliged to prosecute a crime that has been committed in his district; a desire
to realize a return on investment of staff time and resources in the
investigation; and the public relations benefits for him personally and the
office institutionally for convictions of a company responsible for pollution
that affects local residents.
The division of prosecutorial authority in cases of national interest did
not provide guidance to the ECS and the U.S. Attorneys concerning which
charges should be brought against a corporation and where the case should
be prosecuted. Rather, the prosecutors must resolve those issues for
21 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., BLUESHEET REVISION TO THE U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL ON ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES (1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
readingroom/usam env.htm.
22 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 5-11.104 (2000) [hereinafter USAM].
23 id.




themselves under the general Principles of Federal Prosecution that apply to
all Department lawyers.26 On occasion, the current allocation of authority
has had the unintended consequences of making it difficult to resolve cases
in which a corporation is under investigation in multiple jurisdictions and
thus has created tension with longstanding Department policy concerning
successive prosecutions.
II. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PROSECUTIONS
A. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL PROSECUTIONS OF VESSEL OWNERS
Among its major enforcement priorities, the ECS maintains a vessel
pollution program to attack illegal discharges of oily wastewater on the high
seas.2 7 This program has been in place for nearly a decade and commands
15-20% of ECS's resources.28 It has generated a significant number of
multi-jurisdictional prosecutions.29
Under international law, primary enforcement responsibility for
violations of marine environmental standards lies with the country in which
the vessel is registered. 30 A country may have jurisdiction to investigate
and take enforcement action against a foreign flag vessel for illegal
discharges that occur in its ports or near its coasts, subject to international
law limitations. 3' For the most part, however, discharges of oil and other
pollutants in the open ocean are subject to direct enforcement action only by
the flag state.
The vast majority of ocean-going vessels are registered outside the
United States.32 Over the years, U.S. environmental authorities have
concluded that discharges of oil from vessels are having a substantial
adverse effect on the oceans and that many flag states, especially those that
maintain "open registries" (known pejoratively as "flags of convenience"),
are uninterested in or unable to take meaningful enforcement action against
26 Id § 9-27.000.
27 Uhlmann Speech, supra note 18.
28 Uhlmann Interview, supra note 16.
29 See infra Parts II.A.1-2, IV.C.2.
30 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 94, 217, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/
unclos/unclos e.pdf.
31 Id. art. 216.
32 See U.S. MARITIME ADMrN., TOP 20 MERCHANT FLEET OF THE WORLD: SELF-
PROPELLED OCEANGOING VESSELS 1,000 GROSS TONS AND GREATER (2004), available at
http://marad.dot.gov/MARAD-statistics/Flag-MFW-7-04.pdf.
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their vessels.33 In the mid-1990s, the United States developed a legal theory
that has allowed it to enforce governing international standards against
discharges of oil by foreign flag vessels that occur outside U.S.
jurisdictional waters, as long as a vessel ultimately calls in a U.S. port.
34
The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS),35 and the Coast
Guard's implementing regulations,36 require each vessel that calls at a U.S.
port to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book in which all discharges of oil
from the vessel must be documented. The Coast Guard has instituted an
aggressive program of inspecting Oil Record Books of foreign vessels that
call in U.S. ports to detect failures to honor the requirement to document oil
discharges.37 The Department has filed a significant number of criminal
actions against vessel owners for making false statements in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 and other statutes, when the Oil Record Book misrepresents
a discharge as having been in conformance with international requirements,
even if the release occurred outside U.S. jurisdictional waters.
38
1. The Two Prosecutions of Royal Caribbean
Beginning in October 1994, the government conducted an
investigation of allegations that foreign flag vessels owned by Royal
Caribbean Cruise Lines were illegally discharging oily wastewater and
other pollutants into the ocean. 39 The company's vessels called regularly in
many U.S. ports, where they presented the Coast Guard with Oil Record
Books that did not document these discharges. 40  The Department
ultimately initiated criminal investigations in six judicial districts, each of
41which was led by the ECS with assistance from the local U.S. Attorneys.
33 David G. Dickman, Lecturer, United States Criminal Enforcement Related to Vessel-
Source Pollution: The Confluence of National and International Law (Nov. 2001) (ALI-ABA
Advanced Study Course on Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws).
14 See id.
" Pub. L. No. 96-478, 96 Stat. 2297 (1980) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-15). APPS
was promulgated to enforce Annexes I and II of MARPOL, the 1978 Protocol to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978),
amending 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973).
36 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 (2005).
37 Dickman, supra note 33, at 18.
38 See generally infra Parts II.A. 1-2, IV.C.2.
39 Factual Basis at 3-4, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. CR 00-509
(S.D. Fla. July 21, 1999), No. CR 99-737 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 1999), No. CR 99-167 (C.D.
Cal. July 21, 1999), No. CR 99-0089 (D. Ala. July 21, 1999).
40 Id. at 4.
41 Id. at 2.
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In the course of the investigations, the courts vindicated the
government's position that presentation of a false Oil Record Book
constituted a crime that occurred in U.S. territory, even though the
discharge may have occurred outside U.S. jurisdictional waters or in the
territorial waters of another country.42 In United States v. Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Ltd., the court held that the United States could assert criminal
enforcement jurisdiction for a false statement in an Oil Record Book
concerning a discharge that occurred within Bahamian waters. 43  "The
discharge of oil in an improper manner is one crime; the failure to keep an
Oil Record Book as required under MARPOL/APPS is another; and the
deliberate presentation of a false material writing to the U.S. Coast Guard is
another."44
After the Southern District of Florida upheld the government's
authority to prosecute discharges outside U.S. waters, Royal Caribbean
sought to negotiate a comprehensive resolution of its criminal liability.
Even though the ECS held the lead role in each grand jury investigation, the
government initiated a multi-stage, multi-district series of prosecutions and
guilty pleas throughout the country.
a. The First Prosecution
On June 2, 1998, Royal Caribbean entered into a plea agreement with
the ECS and the U.S. Attorneys for the Southern District of Florida and the
District of Puerto Rico.45 The company agreed to plead guilty to seven
counts of illegal discharges of oily wastewater, presentation of false Oil
Record Books, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice.46 It agreed to pay a
$1 million fine in the Southern District of Florida, an $8 million fine in
Puerto Rico, and an additional $1 million as community service.47 The
company also agreed to a term of probation of five years, one condition of
which required it to implement a comprehensive Environmental
Compliance Program under which it would adopt practices for proper
storage, treatment, and disposal of waste streams on all its vessels.48
42 United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (S.D. Fla.
1998).
43 Id.
4 Id. at 1368.
45 Plea Agreement at 1-3, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 96-333
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b. The Second Round of Pleas
The first round of guilty pleas ended neither the investigations nor the
prosecutions. In 1999, the ECS and the U.S. Attorneys in six jurisdictions
prosecuted the company for "similar environmental crimes" to those for
which it had pleaded guilty in 1998.
49
In February 1999, the company initially pleaded guilty to three felony
charges in the Central District of California. In July 1999, Royal
Caribbean, the ECS, and the six U.S. Attorneys entered into- a
comprehensive plea agreement (which included the charges in the Central
District of California), by which the company pleaded guilty to a total of
twenty-one felony counts and agreed to pay an additional $18 million in
fines. 50 The charges and fines were carefully allocated among the six U.S.
Attorneys' Offices as follows:
- Southern District of Florida: four counts; $3 million fine.
- Southern District of New York: four counts; $3 million fine.
- Central District of California: three counts; $3 million fine.
- District of Alaska: seven counts; $6.5 million fine.
- District of the Virgin Islands: two counts; $1.5 million fine.
- District of Puerto Rico: one count; $1 million fine.5'
In each of the six jurisdictions, the government prosecuted the
company for what were essentially the same acts. In each jurisdiction, the
company pleaded guilty to at least one count of presentation of a false Oil
Record Book; the other counts involved illegal discharges of specified
pollutants into U.S. territorial waters and failure to dispose properly of ship-
generated hazardous wastes.5 2 In each jurisdiction, the crimes to which the
company pleaded guilty involved acts that had occurred before entry of the
1998 plea in Miami and San Juan.53 The great majority of these offenses
(sixteen of twenty-one) had occurred in 1994 and 1995.54
In each jurisdiction, Royal Caribbean separately agreed to a five-year
period of probation, one condition of which required implementation of the
Environmental Compliance Program to which the company already had
49 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Royal Caribbean to Pay Record $18 Million
Criminal Fine for Dumping Oil and Hazardous Chemicals, Making False Statements (July
21, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/July/316enr.htm.
50 Plea Agreement, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, No. CR 99167 (C.D. Cal.
July 21, 1999).
51 Id. at 7-19.
52 Factual Basis, supra note 39, at 2-3, 9-18.
" id. at 4-9.
14 Id. at 4-7.
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agreed in the 1998 plea and which the sentencing judge in the Southern
District of Florida had approved.
55
2. The Pattern of Prosecution in Other Vessel Pollution Cases
Other corporate vessel pollution investigations have been resolved by
joint pleas in multiple jurisdictions; a plea in one jurisdiction; or a plea in
one jurisdiction, coupled with an explicit waiver of the Department's ability
to prosecute the company in other districts. None of the other cases was
resolved through two rounds of prosecutions as in the Royal Caribbean
matter.
a. Joint Pleas in Multiple Districts
In March 2004, the U.S. Attorneys for the Western District of
Washington, the Central District of California, and the Northern District of
California entered into a joint plea agreement with H6egh Fleet Services
("HFS"), by which the company pleaded guilty to seven counts each of
knowing failure to maintain an Oil Record Book that recorded all
discharges, presentation of a false Oil Record Book, and obstruction of the
investigation. 6 The counts and fines were explicitly divided among the
three districts:
- Western District of Washington: three counts; $1.5 million fine.
- Central District of California: two counts; $1 million fine.
- Northern District of California: two counts; $1 million fine.57
The company agreed to serve a four-year term of probation, one
condition of which required it to adopt an Environmental Management
System/Compliance Plan, applicable to all thirty-eight HFS vessels. 8
Similarly, in March 2005, the ECS and the U.S. Attorneys for five
districts entered into a joint plea agreement with Evergreen International, by
which the company agreed to plead guilty to twenty-five representative
charges of knowing failure to maintain an Oil Record Book that recorded
all discharges, presentation of a false Oil Record Book, obstruction of the
investigations, and negligent discharge of oily wastewater.5 9  In each
5 Id. at 7-21.
56 Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. H6egh Fleet Servs. A/S, No. CR 03-5765 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 11, 2004), No. CR 04-195 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2004), No. CR 04-40030 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 11, 2004).
7 Id. at 5.
" Id. at 6.
59 Plea Agreement at 23, United States v. Evergreen Int'l, S.A., No. CR 05-238 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 30, 2005), No. 05-291 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2005), No. 05-294 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30,
2005), No. CR 05-305 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2005), No. CR 05-306 (D. Ore. Mar. 30, 2005).
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district, the company agreed to plead guilty to five separate counts and pay
a $5 million fine ($2 million of which took the form of community service
payments). The company also agreed in each jurisdiction to serve a three-
year term of probation, one condition of which required it to adopt a
comprehensive Environmental Compliance Plan that would apply to the
company and three related entities.60
b. Fleet-Wide Prosecution in One District
In April 2002, Carnival Cruises pleaded guilty in the Southern District
of Florida to six felony counts of presenting false Oil Record Books by six
of its vessels. 61 The company was fined $18 million ($9 million of which
was in the form of community service payments).62 Carnival also agreed,
as a condition of probation, to implement a worldwide Environmental
Compliance Plan that would apply to all of its companies that operate cruise
lines, including those not involved in the investigation.
63
c. Fleet-Wide Prosecution in One Jurisdiction, Coupled with Waivers of
Prosecution in Other Jurisdictions
In July 2002, the ECS and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of Florida entered into a plea agreement with Norwegian Cruise Lines, by
which the company agreed to plead guilty to a single count of knowing
failure to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book and to pay a fine of $1
million, plus an additional $500,000 in community service payments.64 The
company agreed to serve a three-year term of probation, one condition of
which required it to adopt a comprehensive Environmental Compliance
Plan applicable to all its cruise ships. In turn, the government agreed to
forego further criminal prosecution of the company in eight other districts.
The pattern of prosecutions demonstrates that there is no inherent
reason why fleet-wide vessel pollution investigations must be resolved
through multiple rounds of prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions, as
occurred in the Royal Caribbean case. The record shows that the
government has been able to obtain large fines and broad and enforceable
future compliance commitments through a single prosecution in one
district.
60 id.
61 Information at 4-9, United States v. Carnival Corp., No. CR 02-20350 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
17, 2002).
62 Id. at 5-6.
63 Id. at 7.
64 Plea Agreement at 1-4, United States v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., No. CR 02-
20631 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2002).
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B. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS OF MCWANE, INC.
In January 2003, prompted by a New York Times article reporting on
alleged environmental and worker safety violations at the company's plants,
the federal government initiated investigations concerning the
environmental practices at industrial facilities owned by McWane, Inc. in
several judicial districts. The ECS conducted most of the investigations,
although the U.S. Attorney took the lead in the District of New Jersey.
The Department ultimately initiated five criminal proceedings against
McWane in four judicial districts.
In December 2003, the company and five employees were indicted in
the District of New Jersey on thirty-five counts arising out of alleged
environmental violations at its Phillipsburg, New Jersey facility, including
violations of the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, CERCLA, and related
Title 18 offenses.6 5 Trial of the case began in September 2005 and was
expected to last five months.
On May 25, 2004, the company and four employees were indicted in
the Northern District of Alabama (Birmingham Division) on twenty-five
counts charging violations of the Clean Water Act and related Title 18
offenses at its Birmingham facility. 66 On June 10, 2005, after a six-week
jury trial, the company was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Clean
Water Act, making a false statement to the government, and eighteen
substantive violations of the Clean Water Act. On December 6, 2005, the
court sentenced the company to pay a fine of $5 million, and the company
agreed to fund a $2.7 million environmental project. The company also
was placed on probation for five years.
67
In March 2005, the company pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of
Texas to one count of concealing material information within the
jurisdiction of EPA and one count of knowing violation of the Clean Air
Act.68 The company agreed to pay a fine of $4.5 million and to serve a
period of five years' probation, one condition of which required
implementation of a Compliance Agreement with EPA that required
extensive environmental improvements.
65 Indictment at 1-51, United States v. Atd. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., Crim. No. 03-852
(D.N.J. Dec. 2003).
66 Indictment at 8-29, United States v. McWane, Inc., Crim. No. 04-PT-0199-S (N.D.
Ala. May 25, 2004).
67 Judgment in a Criminal Case (For Offense(s) Committed On or After November 1,
1987), Mc Wane, Crim. No. 04-PT-0 199-S (Dec. 6, 2005).
68 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Tyler Pipe Co., Crim. No. 6:05-CR-29 (E.D.
Tex., Mar. 2005).
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After the jury in Birmingham convicted the corporation on twenty
counts, the government initiated two further criminal prosecutions against
the entity.
On July 28, 2005, the company was prosecuted for a second time in
the Northern District of Alabama, this time in the Southern Division. It
agreed to plead guilty to one count of a willful violation of a federal
Occupational Safety and Health regulation at its Anniston facility, which
led to the death of an employee, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 666(e); and one
count of treatment of hazardous waste without a permit, in violation of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 69 The company agreed to pay a
fine of $3.5 million, to serve a three-year term of probation, and to perform
community services valued at $750,000.
On November 3, 2005, the company and two individuals were indicted
in the District of Utah on six counts of conspiracy, violations of the Clean
Air Act, and making false statements to EPA concerning its air emissions.70
III. THE POLICY ON SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION
The policies governing Department of Justice attorneys in the exercise
of criminal enforcement authority are set forth in the Principles of Federal
Prosecution, first issued by former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti in
1980 and incorporated into the U.S. Attorneys' Manual.7' The Department
has long maintained a formal policy on successive prosecution, generally
known as the Petite Policy, which governs the decision "whether to bring a
federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transactions
69 Plea Agreement at 1-3, United States v. Union Foundry Co., No. CR 05-00299 (N.D.
Ala. July 28, 2005).
70 Indictment at 6-13, United States v. McWane, Inc., No. CR 05-00811 (D. Utah Nov. 3,
2005).
71 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-27.000. Attorney General Civiletti explained the purposes
of the Principles as follows:
In normal circumstances, the Department of Justice does not investigate or prosecute every
possible felony that comes to our attention. We exercise discretion. We stay our hand in
individual cases.., for the purpose of doing justice and advancing the common good.
Any discretionary power can be abused; and if our investigatory and prosecutorial discretion
could be exercised capriciously or irregularly, it would threaten, not advance, the interests it is
designed to serve. For that reason we have developed guidelines that structure and restrain the
exercise of our discretion in individual cases, thereby introducing a measure of principle and
regularity into a sensitive subjective process.
Benjamin Civiletti, former Attorney Gen., The Alfred P. Murrah Lecture on the
Administration of Justice at Southern Methodist University: Post-Watergate Legislation in
Retrospect (Oct. 31, 1980).
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involved in a prior ... federal proceeding. 72 The purposes served by the
Policy are: "to vindicate substantial federal interests through appropriate
federal prosecutions, to protect persons charged with criminal conduct from
the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions and punishments for
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s), [and] to promote efficient
utilization of Department resources.
7 3
The Petite Policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal
prosecution, following a prior federal prosecution based on substantially the
same acts or transactions, unless three substantive prerequisites are
satisfied: first, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second,
the prior prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably
unvindicated; and third, applying the same test that is applicable to all
federal prosecutions, the government must believe that the defendant's
conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence
probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction by an unbiased
trier of fact. 74 As a procedural prerequisite, the subsequent prosecution
must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General.
By its terms, the Policy on Successive Prosecution applies equally to
corporate defendants and natural persons.7 5 The Policy applies "whenever
there has been a prior . . . federal prosecution resulting in an acquittal, a
conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or
other termination of the case on the merits. 76
In determining whether a second prosecution may be authorized, the
critical factor is the second criterion, whether "the prior prosecution ... left
the federal interest demonstrably unvindicated. ' '77 In this connection, the
Petite Policy explicitly provides that "[i]n general, the Department will
presume that a prior prosecution, regardless of the result, has vindicated the
72 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-2.031.A (emphasis added). The Policy is an internal
Department of Justice guidance, promulgated to guide the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, and does not create any right that is enforceable in court by third parties. Id. § 9-
2.031.F. It is enforceable only by senior policy officials of the Department, in exercising
due diligence over criminal cases that subordinate prosecutors propose to file. See United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
73 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-2.031.A.
74 Id.
75 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations § II.A (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporateguidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo] ("Generally, prosecutors should
apply the same factors in determining whether to charge a corporation as they do with
respect to individuals."); USAM, supra note 22, § 9-27.220.
76 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-2.031 .C (emphasis added).
77 Id. § 9-2031.A.
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relevant federal interest.,7 8  That presumption may be overcome by a
showing that:
- "the prior sentence was manifestly inadequate in light of the federal
interest involved and a substantially enhanced sentence . . . is available
through the contemplated federal prosecution."
- "the choice of charges, or the determination of guilt, or the severity
of the sentence in the prior prosecution was affected by" such factors as
incompetence, corruption, intimidation, undue influence; court or jury
nullification in clear disregard of the evidence or the law; or the
unavailability of significant evidence, either because it was not timely
discovered or known by the prosecution.
79
The scope of the Policy on Successive Prosecution is best explained in
Petite v. United States.s° Petite was indicted and convicted in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania for conspiracy to make false statements in
deportation hearings held in Philadelphia and Baltimore. He was
subsequently indicted and convicted in the District of Maryland for
suborning perjury in the Baltimore hearings. Petite appealed on the ground
that his subsequent conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.8
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General did not
oppose the granting of certiorari but informed the Court that the
government was considering whether the second prosecution "was
consistent with the sound policy of the Department in discharging its
responsibility for the control of government litigation," wholly apart from
the validity of the double jeopardy claim.8 2 After certiorari was granted, the
government filed a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and to
remand with directions to dismiss the indictment. The Department
represented to the Supreme Court that
it is the general policy of the Federal Government "that several offenses arising out of
a single transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the
basis of multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to
defendants and of efficient and orderly law enforcement."
83
The Supreme Court granted the motion and remanded with instructions
to dismiss.
The requirement of the Petite Policy that all offenses arising out of a
single transaction should be prosecuted together remains fully viable,
" Id. § 9-2.031.D.
79 Id.
8' 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
" Id. at 529-30.
82 Id. at 530.
83 Id. (emphasis added).
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despite its longevity. As recently as May 2005, Attorney General Gonzales
stated,
[W]e understand that irresponsible or overreaching exercise of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers-in addition to being unjust-can create its own problems, through
overdeterrence. Overdeterrence can discourage innovation, discourage law-abiding
conduct, and discourage competition .... Additionally, we are mindful of the burdens
and challenges that you and your clients face when there are multiple investigations-
one following the other-by different state and federal governmental agencies into the
same underlying conduct. At the Justice Department, we are fully aware of these
considerations and issues.
84
By its terms and its logic, the Policy on Successive Prosecution is fully
applicable to environmental prosecutions, including cases that span several
judicial districts. With its focus on definition of the federal law
enforcement interest, protecting defendants charged with crime from the
burdens of multiple prosecutions and punishments, and efficiency in the
utilization of scarce prosecutorial resources, the Policy provides an
important analytical tool for assessing the wisdom of the multiple corporate
prosecutions that have been filed in environmental criminal cases.
IV. THE PATTERNS OF PROSECUTION IN SOME MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
CASES CONFLICT WITH LONGSTANDING DEPARTMENT POLICIES
Department policies provide that (1) offenses arising out of the same
underlying misconduct should be charged and tried together in one
prosecution; and (2) there is a presumption that a prior prosecution,
regardless of the result, has vindicated the federal law enforcement
interest.8' These principles apply as fully in the environmental area as they
do in other Department criminal enforcement programs, such as corporate
fraud. Further, in prior environmental cases, the federal law enforcement
interest has in fact been vindicated by a comprehensive prosecution in one
jurisdiction.
8 6
It is difficult to square the patterns of prosecution in several recent
environmental prosecutions, notably Royal Caribbean and McWane, with
these longstanding Department policies. Those multi-jurisdictional
prosecutions have caused the harms that the policies were intended to
prevent, by consuming a disproportionate amount of scarce prosecutorial
84 Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the National Legal Center General
Counsel Conference (May 10, 2005) (emphasis added).
85 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
86 See infra Parts IV.C. 1-2.
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resources and diminishing the "impact of Federal resources on crime" and
imposing unfair burdens on the corporate defendants.87
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES "SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ACTS OR
TRANSACTIONS?"
Under Department policies, two critical questions determine the scope
and locus of prosecutions that may appropriately be brought against a
corporation that is under multi-jurisdictional investigation: (1) whether
"substantially the same acts or transactions," or in the Attorney General's
phrasing "the same underlying conduct," were involved in the alleged
violations in multiple districts; (2) whether a subsequent prosecution in
another jurisdiction would be justified on the ground that the federal law
enforcement interest was not "fully vindicated" by a first, comprehensive
prosecution of the company.
The threshold question is whether "substantially the same acts or
transactions" are involved. In an environmental case, it would be a
relatively simple matter for an advocate of a separate prosecution to argue
that the general policy favoring a consolidated prosecution or the Petite
Policy does not apply, by focusing on relatively small differences in the
operation of industrial plants in different districts or the constituents of
waste streams from vessels that call in different ports. The same problem
affects other areas of criminal enforcement. In those cases, the Department
generally looks to the heart of the matter and does not base its decisions on
distinctions among fact situations articulated in the same manner that
lawyers distinguish adverse precedent. For example, in the cases
coordinated by the Corporate Fraud Task Force, the Department brought
one comprehensive prosecution that addressed all species of criminality that
it found, even if the investigations uncovered multiple numerous distinct
instances of wire fraud or false statements for which the company
technically could have been prosecuted separately in multiple districts.
Under the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Department does not
prosecute every illegal act that could be charged separately against a
corporation. Rather, the Department initially charges "the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction."8 8  Thereafter, the
government determines whether to file additional charges to "adequately
reflect the nature and extent of the criminal conduct involved."89  In
87 Thompson Memo, supra note 75, § XI.B.
88 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-27.300.A; see Thompson Memo, supra note 75, § X1.
89 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-27.320.B.1.
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determining what additional charges to bring against a corporation, the
prosecutor properly may consider the Sentencing Guideline range yielded
by the proposed charges and whether that punishment would be
"proportional to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct." 90  The
Sentencing Guidelines reinforce this policy by requiring that similar
offenses in a "course of conduct" situation be grouped together for
sentencing purposes. 91
The result is that the Department generally brings a comprehensive
prosecution against the corporate defendant in one jurisdiction, even if the
investigations spanned many districts. The indictment or information
contains a representative sample of the violations that, in their totality, are
sufficient to vindicate the law enforcement interest. The most commonly
charged criminal offenses in environmental cases (i.e., illegal discharges
from separate vessels or facilities; submission of fraudulent Oil Record
Books to different Coast Guard officers in various ports; obstruction of the
investigation) fit comfortably within the traditional framework by which the
Department brings representative charges that are proportional to the
magnitude of the misconduct. Indeed, a single, comprehensive prosecution
appears uniquely practicable in multi-district environmental cases, because
of the high likelihood that the ECS will be involved in each investigation.
At another level, some of the most important acts that may be under
investigation in multiple districts explicitly involve, in the Attorney
General's phrase, "the same underlying conduct." In many cases, one focus
of the investigations is whether senior corporate officials are responsible for
illegal acts or systematically ignored their environmental obligations, with
the result that violations of law occurred in several jurisdictions. If senior
level misconduct factors into the government's charging decision, the
policy rationale for a comprehensive prosecution of the company in one
district is likely at its strongest.
B. CONTINUING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
The strongest case for a successive prosecution in another jurisdiction
would be presented if, after the first indictment or the first conviction, the
90 Thompson Memo, supra note 75, § XI.B.
91 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines seek to limit the significance of the government's
charging decision and to prevent multiple punishments for substantially identical offense
conduct by grouping counts and treating the conduct as a single offense for purposes of the
Guideline calculations. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D (2004). Grouping is
appropriate when counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions
connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.
Id. § 3D1.2.
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government determined that the company had continued to violate the law
in a manner similar to the conduct underlying the first case. In the face of
continuing criminal activity, the government's law enforcement interests
obviously would be "demonstrably unvindicated," and the Department
would be fully justified in bringing a second prosecution.
This consideration has not been a factor in the successive prosecutions
in the environmental area. In Royal Caribbean, all charges related to
activity that occurred before the first guilty plea, and sixteen of the twenty-
one counts involved discharges that had occurred at least three years before
the first plea.92 Similarly, in McWane, the conduct involved in the second
prosecution in the Northern District of Alabama and in the District of Utah
case had occurred well before the company was convicted in the
Birmingham proceeding.93
C. OBTAINING THE RELIEF NECESSARY TO VINDICATE THE FEDERAL
INTEREST
In the corporate context, the law enforcement interests of punishment,
deterrence and rehabilitation "are generally accomplished by substantial
fines, mandatory restitution, and institution of appropriate compliance
measures including, if necessary, continued judicial oversight." 94  The
record in environmental criminal cases demonstrates that the government
generally has been able to obtain these sanctions through a single
prosecution.
1. The Government May Obtain a Fine Proportional to the Illegal Conduct
in a Single Prosecution
In prosecutions confined to a single jurisdiction, the Department has
been able to obtain sufficiently large fines to punish and deter corporate
offenders and otherwise vindicate the law enforcement interest. Several
factors combine to give the Department sufficient charging flexibility that it
generally should have a valid factual basis for bringing in one jurisdiction a
sufficient number of charges to produce a criminal fine in the amount the
government believes appropriate. Felonies generally may be punished by a
92 Plea Agreement at 2-5, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 96-333
(D.P.R. June 2, 1998), No. 98-103 (S.D. Fla. June 2. 1998).
93 Plea Agreement at 1-3, United States v. Union Foundry Co., No. CR 05-00299 (N.D.
Ala. July 28, 2005); Statement by Defendant in Advance of Guilty Plea, United States v.
McWane, Inc., No. CR 05-811 (D. Utah Feb. 8, 2006); Indictment at 6-14, McWane, No. CR
05-811 (D. Utah Nov. 3, 2005).
94 Thompson Memo, supra note 75, § XI1.B.
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fine of $500,000 per count or twice the gain obtained by the defendant.95
Environmental statutes permit separate criminal charges to be filed for each
illegal discharge. Pursuant to § 1001, charges may be brought for each
false statement made to the government. 96 In theory, this would allow the
government to file a charge for each time a vessel's Oil Record Book is
produced each time it calls in a port. Moreover, in vessel pollution cases,
the closely related acts of the company's failure to keep an accurate Oil
Record Book and its presentation of an inaccurate Oil Record Book to the
Coast Guard inspectors can be charged as separate offenses.
For example, in United States v. MSC Ship Management Ltd., the
corporate owner of a container ship pleaded guilty in the District of
Massachusetts to eleven counts of violation of APPS and related Title 18
offenses (conspiracy, false statements, obstruction of the investigation,
destruction of evidence) resulting from detection of an illegal bypass pipe
on the vessel, which allowed vessel engineers to make illegal discharges
that bypassed the oil-water separator.97 The company agreed to pay a $10
million criminal fine plus an additional $500,000 in community service
payments.98 The bypass equipment was discovered in a single inspection.9
Nevertheless, the law provided the government sufficient charging authority
so that, without considering possible violations in other U.S. ports in which
the company's eighty-one vessels call, the ECS and the U.S. Attorney were
able to vindicate the government's law enforcement interests and obtain
"the largest criminal fine paid by a defendant in an environmental case in
Massachusetts history." 100
Similarly, in the Carnival case, the government brought a single
prosecution in the district in which the principal port served by the
company's vessels was located. 10 1 Through this case, the Department
obtained a criminal fine of $18 million.'
0 2
9' 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)-(d) (2000).
96 Id. § 1001.
97 Plea Agreement at 7-22, United States v. MSC Ship Mgmt. (H.K.) Ltd., No. CR 05-
10351 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2005).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Ship Company To Pay $10.5 Million for
Covering Up Oil Pollution (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/
December/05_enrd_680%20%20.html.
101 Plea Agreement, United States v. Carnival Corp., No. CR 02-10350 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
17, 2002).
102 Id. at 5.
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2. The Government May Obtain Effective ReliefAssuring Future
Compliance with the Environmental Laws in a Single Proceeding
The Department of Justice may obtain, through one prosecution,
enforceable commitments that the offending corporation will comply with
the environmental laws in the future. Once the government obtains such
relief through an appropriate conviction and sentence, this aspect of the
federal interest is fully vindicated. A subsequent corporate conviction in
another jurisdiction likely would produce only redundant terms of probation
and environmental compliance obligations.
For example, in United States v. A.P. Moller-Maersk, A/S, the vessel
owner entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney for the
Northern District of California, by which it pleaded guilty to a single count
of presentation of an Oil Record Book and agreed to pay a fine of
$500,000.'o3 The company agreed to serve a three-year term of probation,
as a condition of which it was required to adopt an Environmental
Compliance Plan that would apply to eighty-five vessels in its fleet.,
0 4
Similarly, in MSC Ship Management, as part of its guilty plea involving a
single ship, the company was required to implement an Environmental
Compliance Plan that would apply to eighty-one ships that call in the
United States.10 5 In the Carnival case, as part of a plea agreement in the
Southern District of Florida, the company agreed to adopt an Environmental
Compliance Plan that would apply to all vessels operated by its subsidiary
cruise lines.10 6 The federal interest in rehabilitation and compliance was
fully vindicated by these single convictions.
The government's ability to obtain comprehensive remedial relief is
not confined to vessel pollution cases. In United States v. BP Exploration
(Alaska), Inc., the ECS and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Alaska
entered into a plea agreement with the local exploration subsidiary of a
company by which the subsidiary pleaded guilty to one count of the strict
liability crime of failure to notify the government of the release of a
hazardous substance, was fined $500,000, and was sentenced to five years'
103 Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. A.P. Moller-Maersk, A/S, No. CR 05-00606
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005).
104 Id.
105 See supra note 81.
106 Further, in the plea agreement in Hoegh, the company agreed to make all thirty-eight
of its vessels subject to the Environmental Management System imposed as a condition of
probation. See supra note 45. Similarly, in Evergreen International, the company agreed, as
a term of probation, that its Environmental Compliance Plan would apply to the company
and three related entities. See supra note 47.
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probation. 10 7 As a condition of probation, the defendant and its corporate
parent agreed to establish a permanent Environmental Management System
that would cover all BP Amoco companies, subsidiaries, and affiliated
business entities engaged in the exploration, drilling, or production of oil
anywhere in the United States or its territories, including offshore
operations in the Gulf of Mexico.'08
In sum, in prior environmental criminal cases, the Department has
obtained through one conviction in a single prosecution sufficient fines and
enforceable rehabilitation and compliance commitments from corporations
to satisfy the federal law enforcement interest. Under these circumstances,
since the federal interest has already been vindicated, a subsequent
corporate prosecution in another jurisdiction would violate the policy on
successive prosecution.
D. LOCALIZED NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
Illegal discharges may cause discrete harm to humans and the
environment in the local area where they occur.'0 9 It could be argued that
this factor differentiates environmental enforcement from other types of
criminal cases that the Department prosecutes in one jurisdiction (i.e.,
securities fraud, where illegal acts may occur in many jurisdictions but the
harm to shareholders is identical), and justifies separate prosecution and
punishment in multiple districts if there were illegal releases in several
localities.
The flaw in this argument is that harm to the environment is not cured
by the acts of prosecution and conviction. The criminal process can punish
and deter the offender and obtain enforceable commitments for future
environmental compliance. Clean ups and restitution, however, are
obtained through separate civil lawsuits and administrative proceedings.
The civil suits often are settled by consent decrees drafted in cooperation
107 Plea Agreement at 3-4, United States v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., No. CR 99-
0141 (D. Alaska Sept. 23, 1999).
108 Id. at 9-10.
109 "Harm" has several meanings in environmental criminal cases, in addition to its role
in determining the proper locus for a prosecution discussed in the text. Strictly speaking,
proof of harm is not an essential element of most environmental crimes. In many cases, it is
not possible for scientists to show that the environment actually was harmed by a specific
illegal discharge, although it can be shown that all discharges taken as a group have adverse
effects. Environmental prosecutors nonetheless are concerned about the absence of proof of
harm in their cases and will introduce it if available. Their concern is absent evidence of
harm, defense counsel will portray the case as a victimless crime, which might make juries
less willing to convict, especially individuals, and judges less willing to impose strong
sentences.
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with the Environmental Protection Agency. The potential collateral
estoppel effect of a criminal conviction plays an important role in the
preparation of these decrees.
The punishment and deterrence effects of the criminal process on the
offender are identical regardless of the district in which an appropriate
conviction is obtained. If a comprehensive case can be brought in one
jurisdiction, then a separate conviction need not be obtained in each other
local jurisdiction to accomplish these results, because the first conviction
will vindicate this federal interest. This is particularly true in vessel
pollution cases, where the principal harm is interference with a
governmental function, the ability of the Coast Guard to police compliance
with applicable legal requirements. This federal interest is not local in
nature and can be vindicated by one conviction in any appropriate
jurisdiction.
Similarly, as discussed above, the environmental compliance
obligations obtained by a corporate conviction in one jurisdiction will
protect all other districts, as demonstrated by BP Exploration (Alaska),
Carnival, Norwegian Cruise Lines, A.P. Moeller-Maersk, and MSC Ship
Management. The six pleas in the second round of prosecutions in Royal
Caribbean clearly demonstrate that even if a successive prosecution occurs,
the terms of probation and the Environmental Compliance Program that
would be imposed by the sentencing court are no different from those that
the government may obtain in the first prosecution.''
0
In sum, localized differences in the environmental harm suffered
cannot be resolved through the criminal process. They must be addressed
in a different manner, by carefully tailoring the Environmental Compliance
Plan and the Consent Decree in any companion civil case to address in
detail each type of illegal discharge that occurred in corporate facilities.
E. CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
Due to its decentralized structure, the Department of Justice has long
wrestled with the problems caused by the desire of a U.S. Attorney to bring
a prosecution if an investigation produces sufficient admissible evidence
that a crime occurred in his jurisdiction. In this regard, the "environmental
harm" factor plays a different, and important, role in the Department's
prosecutorial calculus, in the sense that the U.S. Attorney may insist on
filing criminal charges if an illegal discharge caused significant harm to the
local environment or otherwise was highly publicized. This consideration
appears to have played a part in the Department's decision to require pleas
110 Factual Basis, supra note 39, at 7-21.
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in multiple jurisdictions in the Hdegh, Evergreen International, and Royal
Caribbean cases.
This dynamic within the Department is no different in the
environmental field than in other criminal enforcement areas. It is inherent
in the division of authority between litigating units in Main Justice and the
U.S. Attorneys. In the environmental area as elsewhere, this issue involves
a mixture of principled arguments and considerations of self-interest of the
prosecutorial units involved.
Neither the Principles of Federal Prosecution nor the Thompson
Memorandum authorize the filing of multiple prosecutions to accommodate
the competing desires of various prosecutorial units within the agency.
Rather, the Department's policy remains, as it was at the time of Petite, that
all offenses based on the same acts or transactions should be brought in one
prosecution. This means that, as in other enforcement areas, the issues of
what charges should be brought, and in which District, should be resolved
through discussions among the affected prosecutors, applying the standards
set forth in the Principles of Federal Prosecution. The outcome in the
environmental criminal area is anomalous, however, because the
Department appears to rely on multi-district prosecutions more frequently
than it does in other areas.
F. POTENTIAL PROSECUTION OF INDIVIDUALS
Another recurring issue that applies in environmental criminal cases,
as it does in other enforcement areas, is the relationship between a corporate
prosecution and the potential prosecution of individual employees. This
issue inevitably becomes entangled with questions, discussed elsewhere in
this symposium, concerning the Department's suggestions that in order to
receive credit for cooperation, a corporation should waive the attorney-
client privilege for internal investigations." 1 The Thompson Memorandum
specifically cautions prosecutors that they "should be wary of attempts to
shield corporate officers and employees from liability by a willingness of
the corporation to plead guilty." 1 2 The Chief of the ECS has stated his
concern that when the Department seeks to investigate whether higher level
111 See Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton
Co./TSKI's Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption
Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
503 (2006); William R. McLucas, Howard M. Shapiro & Julie J. Song, The Decline of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621
(2006).
112 Thompson Memo, supra note 75, § VI.B.
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company officials were responsibly involved in environmental violations,
corporations may try to hide the facts behind broad privilege claims.'"
3
One aspect of the discussion of corporate pleas and waiver of the
privilege is unique to environmental crimes, in light of the record of prior
multi-district prosecutions in this area: What the Department should not do
is use its decentralized organization and the multi-jurisdictional nature of
many environmental investigations as a tool to bludgeon a company into
waiving the privilege and settling. The government should not seek to
disaggregate or unbundle otherwise similar violations and pile on
indictments in other districts besides the jurisdiction that is the focal point
of the criminal activity. Such an approach would convert the privilege
waiver from a factor to be considered in determining the adequacy of the
company's cooperation analysis into a mandatory condition of obtaining a
plea. Such a course of action would not be justified either by the Principles
of Federal Prosecution or by the Thompson Memorandum and would
contradict repeated public statements by senior Department officials.
If a company refuses to agree to a plea, the Department should bring a
comprehensive prosecution against related acts that sufficiently vindicates
the federal law enforcement interest and should bring that case to trial. As
noted, the government can be confident in its ability to prevail because of
the quasi-strict liability nature of environmental crimes for corporations, in
the absence of a specific intent requirement.
V. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD ESTABLISH A NEW DECISION MAKING
PROCESS To RESOLVE ISSUES PRESENTED BY MULTI-DISTRICT
ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
As the prior analysis shows, there generally are no considerations
unique to the environmental area. That means that, in this area alone, the
federal interest would be "demonstrably unvindicated" by bringing a
comprehensive criminal prosecution against a corporation in one
jurisdiction. The policy on successive prosecution applies fully in this field.
However, the pattern of prosecutions in environmental cases suggests that
the decisionmaking process within the Department has not always worked
effectively in multi-jurisdictional investigations. Accordingly, the
Department would be well advised to develop a new procedure to consider
the policy decisions presented by multi-district investigations, modeled on
the successful operation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force.
113 Uhlmann Speech, supra note 18.
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A. SEVERAL PROSECUTIONS APPEAR INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PETITE POLICY
Several recent environmental prosecutions appear inconsistent with the
principles set forth in the Petite Policy.
1. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
In Royal Caribbean, there is little ground for arguing that the first
round of convictions left the federal interest "demonstrably
unvindicated."1 4 The company pleaded guilty to the seven counts that the
Department demanded, and the courts imposed the sentences that the ECS
sought.115 It thus cannot be said that the "prior sentence was manifestly
inadequate in light of the federal interest involved," because the
government received what it wanted.' 
1 6
The conduct involved in the second prosecutions occurred prior to
entry of the first pleas; indeed, sixteen of the twenty-one charges occurred
at least three years previously. The terms of probation, including the
critical environmental compliance obligations, were identical to those
imposed after the first convictions. In the end, all the Department achieved
through the second round of prosecutions was an increase in the criminal
fine, while consuming a significant amount of prosecutorial and
investigative resources.
2. United States v. McWane, Inc.
In McWane, the government brought a thirty-five count indictment in
New Jersey for what it has characterized as "a whole host of environmental
crimes and worker safety violations ... a far reaching conspiracy to violate
environmental and worker safety laws, and to cover up those violations
through false statements, witness intimidation and obstruction of justice."' 
1 7
Even assuming that the outcome of this trial would not sufficiently
vindicate the federal interest, the situation changed fundamentally when the
Department later indicted and obtained a twenty count jury verdict against
the company in the Northern District of Alabama. After that conviction, it
would be exceedingly difficult for the government to show that the results
of those two prosecutions would leave the federal interest "demonstrably
unvindicated." Nonetheless, the Department thereafter brought two further
114 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-2.031.A.
115 Plea Agreement at 7-19, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, No. CR 99167
(C.D. Cal. July 21, 1999).
116 Id. § 9-2.031.D.
1 17 Uhlmann Interview, supra note 16.
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criminal prosecutions against the company on environmental and worker
safety charges similar to those involved in the first two cases. Even if the
courts sentenced the company to the maximum fine available in the last two
cases, the increased fine would not constitute the kind of "substantially
enhanced sentence" that the Petite Policy requires in order to justify a
successive prosecution.
18
3. Multi-Jurisdictional Vessel Pollution Prosecutions
In the multi-jurisdictional vessel pollution prosecutions, the counts and
pleas were carefully allocated among the various districts. This pattern
raises the question whether multiple pleas were required, rather than a
comprehensive plea in one jurisdiction, to resolve the centrifugal problems
within the Department. Since there is no centralized decisionmaking forum
for multi-district cases, there is a risk that one or more prosecuting units
involved in one branch of the case will take the defendant's desire to settle
as an opportunity to insist on a separate plea in its jurisdiction as the price
to be paid for obtaining the finality that the corporation seeks to obtain.
The time and expense involved in such seriatim negotiations can prove
quite substantial.
B. RECENT PROSECUTIONS APPEAR TO GIVE LITTLE WEIGHT TO
SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION CONSIDER IMPORTANT
In addition to vindicating federal law enforcement interests, the Policy
on Successive Prosecution is intended "to protect persons charged with
criminal conduct from the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions
and punishments for substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s) [and] to
promote efficient utilization of Department resources."' 9  These
considerations appear to have been given little or no weight in some prior
environmental cases.
1. The Burdens Associated with Multiple Prosecutions
Defending a government investigation and subsequent prosecution is
an expensive proposition, even for large companies. The costs of defending
multiple investigations increase substantially with each new case.
Environmental consultants' fees and attorneys' fees are substantial, and the
costs escalate substantially if an indictment is returned. The time and
attention of corporate management is diverted from normal business
118 USAM, supra note 22, § 9-2.031.D.
"9 Id. § 9-2.031.A.
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activities, which can adversely affect the company's competitive position.
Moreover, the salaries and expenses incurred by corporate staff tasked with
collecting documents and responding to prosecutors' requests can be a
substantial drain on company funds.
The burden on companies has been of great significance in the vessel
pollution cases. The boarding of ships, inspections of vessels, and requests
to produce crew members in multiple locations can delay scheduled
departures and arrivals in port. These factors can substantially disrupt the
day-to-day operations of cruise lines, oil and gas tankers, and container
ships, with severe consequences for the vessel owner. In addition, most
witnesses in these investigations are foreign citizens who spend much of
their time at sea, which means that the owner faces significant staffing
problems when vessel personnel have to be produced in investigations. The
company also incurs substantial costs when documents must be obtained
from vessels scattered all over the world.
Taken together, these factors place a substantial operational and
financial burden on companies called upon to defend multiple
investigations and prosecutions. In addition, there is a substantial fairness
issued presented by the multiplication of investigations and criminal
charges. There is a "David versus Goliath" element to this situation. It is
difficult enough for a company to take on the government in a single case.
The piling on of criminal charges in multiple districts applies substantial
leverage against the company to settle for reasons that may bear little
relation to the validity of a particular charge, taken in isolation.
2. Efficient Utilization of Government Resources
The Thompson Memorandum provides that corporate prosecutions
should "maximize the impact of Federal resources on crime."1 20 There are
substantial reasons to believe that successive prosecutions in the
environmental field have not had that effect.
As the Petite Policy notes, successive prosecutions come at a
substantial cost to the government, including both direct costs and
opportunity costs.
- The direct costs include the time and attention of prosecutors; the
costs of investigating agents (at EPA, the FBI, and the Coast Guard); the
costs of technical personnel and support staff, and the costs to the judicial
120 Thompson Memo, supra note 75, § XI.B.
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system of running multiple grand juries and conducting multiple trials or
plea proceedings.
12 1
- The opportunity costs reflect the fact that while prosecutors and
investigators are running out the string by preparing successive
prosecutions against a company, these resources will be diverted from the
higher-valued return to the public offered by the detection and prosecution
of environmental crimes that are not already known. The resources devoted
to successive prosecutions produce a diminishing marginal return for the
federal interest. The benefits that would be derived by freeing up the
resources that have been diverted to successive prosecutions and using them
to fund new investigations may not be quantifiable, but they are real.
Efficiency in the use of scarce prosecutorial resources should be a
priority concern of senior Department officials. As Attorney General
Gonzales testified before Congress in March 2005, as part of the
Department's efforts to improve its management in the current era of
greater budget discipline: "the Department continues to evaluate its
programs and operations with the goals of achieving both component-
specific and departmental economies of scale, increased efficiencies, and
cost savings/offsets to permit us to fund initiatives that are of higher
priority. Avoiding the waste of governmental resources incurred
through successive prosecutions of conduct that is highly similar to
behavior that is already the subject of a criminal proceeding would
contribute to the cost-efficiency of department operations.
C. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CREATE AN INTERNAL PROCESS TO
ADDRESS THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY MULTI-JURISDICTION
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
To avoid repetition of the waste of government resources and apparent
piling on that has occurred in recent multi-jurisdictional prosecutions, the
Department should establish a new policy process that would allow senior
121 The Department has reduced these costs in one respect by no longer holding separate
sentencing hearings in each District involved in a multi-jurisdictional prosecution. The
current practice is to have cases transferred to one jurisdiction for sentencing in all
proceedings, which saves court time and ensures consolidated probation. This practice does
not avoid the major expenses involved in successive prosecutions, which are incurred at the
investigation stage. Moreover, if the cases are sufficiently similar that they can be sentenced
together, this practice begs the question why the illegal conduct cannot also be prosecuted in
one comprehensive case.
122 Statement before the Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong.




policy officials to review and determine, on a comprehensive basis and after
full discussion between the Environment Division and the U.S. Attorneys in
whose districts the investigations are underway, how appropriate criminal
charges could be brought against an offending corporation in one
proceeding, and in a manner that fully vindicates the federal interest.
As with the Corporate Fraud Task Force, this policy review group
should include officials from Main Justice and affected U.S. Attorneys.
The group should provide a forum for senior officials to discuss among
themselves and resolve what degree of corporate punishment is appropriate,
given the evidence discovered in all the investigations, and where a
comprehensive prosecution should be brought to vindicate the federal
interests involved. Such a policy process would better assure that these
decisions are driven by the policy factors set forth in the Principles of
Federal Prosecution, and would avoid the waste of prosecutorial resources
that would be involved in massing successive corporate prosecutions that
produce little marginal benefit for the public.
The Department could institute such an arrangement on a case-by-case
basis for a particular investigation. However, the Department would be
well advised to institute this policy change through a general order issued
before it is needed in a particular case, to eliminate the risk that it would be
subject to political criticism that the action was driven by potential
favoritism in a specific case.
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